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Raising Tensions in the Asia-Pacific Region 
 
 
 
 
Raul (Pete) Pedrozo* 
 
When you see a rattlesnake poised to strike,  
you do not wait until he has struck before you crush him. 
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (1941)** 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
    
  ithin the span of six weeks, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
took a series of illegal and provocative actions in the East and South China 
Seas that raised eyebrows in capitals around the world and further contrib-
uted to the deteriorating security situation in the Asia-Pacific region. On 
November 23, 2013, China unexpectedly declared an air defense identifica-
tion zone (ADIZ) over a large portion of the East China Sea that overlaps 
portions of the South Korean and Japanese ADIZs. Both ADIZs have 
been in existence since 1951.1 Two weeks later, on December 5, 2013, a 
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People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) warship intentionally crossed the 
bow of the USS Cowpens (CG-63) and came to a full stop, forcing the U.S. 
warship to take evasive action to avoid a collision. The following month, 
China began enforcing new regulations that purport to require foreign fish-
ing vessels to obtain prior approval from Chinese authorities to operate in 
over 2 million square kilometers of ocean space in the South China Sea 
over which Hainan Province asserts jurisdiction. 
Each of these measures is designed to alter the status quo in the East 
and South China Seas and bring China one step closer to achieving its “sa-
lami-slicing”2 campaign to gain effective control over events in what it calls 
the “Near Seas.” These acts also demonstrate Beijing’s long-standing dis-
tain for the post-war international system—a system it had no role in shap-
ing. In addition, they show a need to upset what China views as a Western-
dominated legal system in order to bolster its anti-access/area denial 
(A2/AD) strategy,3 and to provide a firmer legal basis to challenge U.S. 
military activities in and over its exclusive economic zone (EEZ).  
Although the nations most directly affected by the new measures—
Japan, the Philippines, South Korea (ROK) and Vietnam—have strongly 
condemned China’s provocative actions, reactions by the United States and 
other regional States have been mixed. This paper examines the legality of 
China’s recent endeavors to change the status quo through threats and in-
                                                                                                                      
1. The zone includes the airspace within the area enclosed by China’s outer limit of 
the territorial sea and the following six points: 33º11’N (North Latitude) and 121º47’E 
(East Longitude), 33º11’N and 125º00’E, 31º00’N and 128º20'E, 25º38’N and 125º00’E, 
24º45’N and 123º00’E, 26º44’N and 120º58’E. Statement by the Government of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China on Establishing the East China Sea Air Defense Identification 
Zone (Nov. 23, 2013), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-11/23/c_13291 
1635.htm [hereinafter Chinese Government Statement on Identification]. 
2. China’s “salami-slicing” campaign “involves a steady progression of small actions, 
none of which serves as a casus belli by itself, yet which over time lead cumulatively to a 
strategic transformation in China’s favor.” Brahma Chellaney, China’s Salami-Slicing Strategy, 
THE JAPAN TIMES (July 25, 2013), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2013/07/25/ 
commentary/chinas-salami-slice-strategy/#.UwzlDvldV8F. 
3. Adm. Jonathan Greener, Projecting Power, Assuring Access, THE OFFICIAL BLOG OF 
THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (May 10, 2012) http://cno.navylive.dodlive.mil 
/2012/05/10/projecting-power-assuring-access/ (“A goal of an A2AD strategy is to make 
others believe it can close off international airspace or waterways and that U.S. military 
forces will not be able (or willing to pay the cost) to reopen those areas or come to the aid 
of our allies and partners. In peacetime, this gives the country with the A2AD weapons 
leverage over their neighbors and reduces U.S. influence. In wartime, A2AD capabilities 
can make U.S. power projection more difficult.”). 
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timidation. It concludes with recommendations of responses that the Unit-
ed States and other States can employ to resist China’s destabilizing activi-
ties in the region. 
 
II. AIR DEFENSE IDENTIFICATION ZONES 
 
According to the Ministry of National Defense (MND), China’s new 
ADIZ over the East China Sea was established to protect PRC sovereignty 
and territorial and airspace security, as well as maintain flying order.4 All 
aircraft entering the zone purportedly must comply with the Aircraft Identifi-
cation Rules and provide the following information: 
  
1. Flight plan identification. Aircraft flying in the East China Sea Air 
Defense Identification Zone should report the flight plans to the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China or the Civil Aviation 
Administration of China. 
2. Radio identification. Aircraft flying in the East China Sea Air Defense 
Identification Zone must maintain the two-way radio communications, 
and respond in a timely and accurate manner to the identification inquir-
ies from the administrative organ of the East China Sea Air Defense 
Identification Zone or the unit authorized by the organ. 
3. Transponder identification. Aircraft flying in the East China Sea Air 
Defense Identification Zone, if equipped with the secondary radar tran-
sponder, should keep the transponder working throughout the entire 
course. 
4. Logo identification. Aircraft flying in the East China Sea Air Defense 
Identification Zone must clearly mark their nationalities and the logo of 
their registration identification in accordance with related international 
treaties.5 
 
Additionally, aircraft operating in the ADIZ are required to follow the 
instructions of the administrative organ of the zone—the PRC MND. Air-
craft that do not cooperate with the identification procedures or follow the 
                                                                                                                      
4. China Exclusive: Defense Ministry Spokesman Responds to Air Defense Identification Zone 
Questions, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY (Nov. 23, 2013),  http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/ 
china/2013-11/23/c_132912145.htm [hereinafter China Exclusive]. 
5. Announcement of the Aircraft Identification Rules for the East China Sea Air Defense Identifi-
cation Zone of the P.R.C., XINHUA NEWS AGENCY (Nov. 23, 2013), http://news.xinhuanet 
.com/english/china/2013-11/23/c_132911634.htm. 
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instructions of the MND will be subject to undefined “defensive emergen-
cy measures.”6 The MND spokesman stated, however, that the establish-
ment of the zone does not change the “legal nature of relevant airspace” 
and that “normal flight of international flights in the zone” would not be 
affected.7 
The PRC declaration drew an immediate and sharp protest from the 
Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). The protest emphasized 
that the ADIZ was “totally unacceptable as it included the Japanese territo-
rial airspace over the Senkaku Islands” and that “China’s unilateral estab-
lishment of . . . [the zone] was extremely dangerous as it could unilaterally 
escalate the situation surrounding the Senkaku Islands and lead to an unex-
pected occurrence of accidents in the airspace.”8 The following day, Japan’s 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Fumio Kishida, issued a strongly worded 
statement condemning the PRC declaration, indicating that the establish-
ment of the zone unilaterally changes the status quo and “may cause unin-
tended consequences in the East China Sea.”9 The Foreign Minister further 
emphasized that the new zone unduly infringes “freedom of flight in inter-
national airspace, which . . . will have serious impacts . . . on the order and 
safety of civil aviation.”10 The Minister’s statement also rejected any impli-
cation that the airspace over the Senkaku Islands was Chinese territorial 
airspace, and demanded that China “revoke any measures that could in-
fringe upon the freedom of flight in international airspace.”11 Minister Ki-
shida concluded by stating that Japan would “respond firmly, but in a calm 
manner against China’s attempt to unilaterally alter the status quo by coer-
cive measures with determination to defend resolutely its territorial land, 
sea and airspace.”12 
                                                                                                                      
6. Id. 
7. China Exclusive, supra note 4. 
8. Protest by Mr. Junichi Ihara, Director-General of the Asian and Oceanian Affairs 
Bureau, MOFA, to Mr. Han Zhingiang, Minister of the Chinese Embassy in Japan, Chi-
na’s Establishment of an Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea (Nov. 23, 
2013), http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_000100.html.  
9. Statement by the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs on the Announcement on 
the “East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone” by the Ministry of National De-
fense of the People’s Republic of China (Nov. 24, 2013), http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/ 
release/press4e_000098.html. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
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The PRC declaration prompted a similar reaction from South Korea. 
The ROK Ministry of Defense (MOD) “expressed concern that China’s 
latest move was heightening military tension in the region.”13 ROK Vice 
Defense Minister Baek Seung-joo also conveyed Seoul’s “strong regret” 
that the Chinese ADIZ included airspace over Socotra Rock (Ieodo/Suyan 
Rock), which is controlled by South Korea, and the Japanese-administered 
Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands.14 Vice Minister Baek emphasized that South Ko-
rea did not recognize the zone and demanded that China amend its bound-
aries, particularly the area that overlaps the ROK ADIZ west of Jeju Is-
land.15 Two weeks later, on December 8, South Korea extended its ADIZ 
186 miles to the south to correspond with the boundaries of the pre-
existing ROK flight information region.16  
Unlike China, however, ROK authorities consulted with China, Japan 
and the United States before announcing the ADIZ expansion.17 The Unit-
ed States commended South Korea for speaking with its neighbors prior to 
adjusting its ADIZ and for its commitment to implementing the zone “in a 
manner consistent with international practice and respect for the freedom 
of overflight and other internationally lawful uses of international air-
space.”18  
                                                                                                                      
13. S Korea Protests against China Air Identification Zone (Press TV broadcast Nov. 28, 
2013), http://www.presstv.com/detail/2013/11/28/337125/s-korea-protests-at-china-
air-zone/.  
14. Both China and South Korea claim jurisdiction over the sea area and sea bed 
around Socotra Rock. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Choe Sang-Hun, South Korea Announces Expansion of its Air Defense Zone, THE NEW 
YORK TIMES (Dec. 9, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/09/world/asia/east-
china-sea-air-defense-zone.html?_r=0. 
17. Id. The expanded zone took effect on December 15, 2013. Japan indicated that it 
does not object to the ROK expansion. Japan OKs South Korea’s Expanded Air Defense Zone, 
JAPAN DAILY PRESS (Dec. 9, 2013), http://japandailypress.com/japan-oks-south-koreas-
expanded-air-defense-zone-0940672/. China, on the other hand, expressed “regret” over 
the ROK’s decision. Hong Lei, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson, Hong Lei’s Regular Press 
Conference (Dec. 9, 2013), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2511/t1107035 
.shtml. See also China Regrets ROK Air Zone Expansion, PEOPLE’S DAILY (Dec. 9, 2013), 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90883/8479206.html.  
18. Jen Psaki, Spokesperson, U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing, Dec. 9, 
2013, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2013/12/218531.htm#CHINA. See also Chi-
co Harlan, South Korea will Expand its Air Defense Zone, Defense Ministry Says, THE WASHING-
TON POST (Dec. 8, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/south-korea-will-
expand-its-air-defense-zone-defense-ministry-says/2013/12/08/eada68fa-5fd8-11e3-
8d24-31c016b976b2_story.html. 
 
 
 
The Bull in the China Shop Vol. 90 
 
71 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     In further defiance of the Chinese declaration, Japanese and South Ko-
rea military aircraft conducted a series of operational challenges of the new-
ly established ADIZ several days after the PRC announcement. On No-
vember 26, a ROK reconnaissance aircraft penetrated the PRC ADIZ in 
the vicinity of Socotra Rock without providing prior notification to Chi-
nese authorities.19 That same day, Japanese Self Defense Force (JSDF) air-
craft conducted an unannounced reconnaissance mission over the contest-
ed Senkaku Islands.20 A week later, the ROK Navy carried out a search and 
rescue (SAR) exercise in the waters around Socotra Rock—two P-3C mari-
time patrol aircraft and an Aegis-class destroyer (Yulgok Yi I (DDG 992)) 
participated in the operation.21 Then on December 12, the ROK Navy and 
the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) conducted a joint mar-
itime SAR exercise within the PRC ADIZ. The exercise included the use of 
helicopters in the ADIZ without notice to Chinese authorities.22 Both 
Seoul and Tokyo have also instructed Korean and Japanese civil aircraft to 
not file flight plans with Chinese authorities as required by the new regula-
tions.23 
International law does not prohibit nations from establishing an ADIZ 
in international airspace adjacent to their national airspace.24 In fact, as 
China correctly points out, a number of nations, including the United 
                                                                                                                      
19. Japanese and South Korean Aircraft Enter Chinese ADIZ, WANT CHINA TIMES (Nov. 
29, 2013), http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20131129000064 
&cid=1101. 
20. Id. 
21. Of note, South Korea requested permission from Japan for the two P-3C aircraft 
to cross into the Japanese ADIZ. Zachary Keck, South Korea Conducts Military Drill in Chi-
na’s ADIZ, THE DIPLOMAT (Dec. 4, 2013), http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/south-
korea-conducts-military-drill-in-chinas-adiz/. 
22. Japan, S. Korea Hold Joint Sea Drill in China Air Zone, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE 
(Dec. 12, 2013), http://www.ndtv.com/article/world/japan-south-korea-hold-joint-sea-
drill-in-china-air-zone-457933. 
23. Thom Shanker, U.S. Sends Two B-52 Bombers Into Air Zone Claimed by China, THE 
NEW YORK TIMES (Nov. 26, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/27/world/asia/ 
us-flies-b-52s-into-chinas-expanded-air-defense-zone.html?_r=0; Julian Barnes, Yuka 
Hayashi & Jeremy Page, Stakes Escalate For Biden in Beijing, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL 
(Dec. 4, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405270230457940457923 
665294784406. 
24. JAMES KRASKA & RAUL PEDROZO, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME SECURITY LAW, § 
6.4.2.1 (2013); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY & DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECU-
RITY, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-12/COMDTPUB P5800.7A, THE COMMANDER'S HAND-
BOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS § 2.7.2.3 (2007) [hereinafter NWP 1-14M]. 
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States,25 Japan26 and South Korea,27 have established ADIZs in internation-
al airspace off their coasts.28 Even the International Civil Aviation Organi-
zation (ICAO) recognizes the existence of such zones, describing the term 
in Annex 15 of the Chicago Convention.29  
The United States defines an ADIZ as “an area of airspace over land or 
water in which the ready identification, location, and control of all aircraft 
(except for Department of Defense and law enforcement aircraft) is re-
quired in the interest of national security.”30 The legal basis for creating 
such zones is that States enjoy the right to establish reasonable conditions 
of entry into their land territory.31 Thus, the legal theory for an ADIZ is 
analogous to imposition of conditions of port entry for ships entering into 
                                                                                                                      
25. The United States established the first ADIZ (in conjunction with Canada) in 
1950 and currently maintains four such zones: Contiguous U.S. ADIZ (14 C.F.R. § 99.43 
(2004)), Alaska ADIZ (14 C.F.R. § 99.45 (2004)), Guam ADIZ (14 C.F.R. § 99.47 (2004)), 
and Hawaii ADIZ (14 C.F.R. § 99.49 (2004)). See Directing the Secretary of Commerce to 
Exercise Security Control Over Aircraft In Flight, Exec. Order No. 10197, reprinted in 15 
Fed. Reg. 9180 (Dec. 22, 1950). 
26. The Japanese ADIZ was originally established by the United States in 1951 during 
its post-war occupation of Japan. Management of the zone was transferred to Japan in 
1969. The zone was expanded in 1972 and in 2010. MARK MANYIN, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERVICE, R42761, SENKAKU (DIAOYU/DIAOYUTAI) ISLANDS DISPUTE: U.S. TREATY OB-
LIGATIONS, 4-5 (2013); Shih Hsiu-chuan, Japan Extends ADIZ into Taiwan Space, TAIPEI 
TIMES (June 26, 2010), http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2010/06/26/ 
2003476438.  
27. The United States also established the South Korean ADIZ in 1951 during the 
Korean War. 
28. Hua Chunying, Spokesperson, People’s Republic of China, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Regular Press Conference, Dec. 18, 2013, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/ 
s2510/2511/t1110094.shtml.  
29. An ADIZ is defined “as a special designated airspace of defined dimensions with-
in which aircraft are required to comply with special identification and/or reporting pro-
cedures that supplement those related to civil air traffic services (ATS).” Convention on 
International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 15 U.N.T.S. 295, Annex 15, International 
Standards and Recommended Practices, Aeronautical Information Services, § 1.1 (14th ed. 
July 2013) [hereinafter Chicago Convention]. 
30. Definitions 14 C.F.R. § 99.3 (2004). 
31. Chicago Convention, supra note 29, art. 1 (providing that “every State has com-
plete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.”). For purposes of the 
Convention the territory of a State includes the “land area and territorial waters adjacent 
thereto under the sovereignty . . . of such State.” Id., art. 2. See also United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea art. 2, Dec. 10, 1982, 1883 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UN-
CLOS] (“The sovereignty of a coastal State . . . extends to the air space over the territorial 
sea.”). 
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port or traversing internal waters.32 An aircraft approaching national air-
space may therefore be required to identify itself even while in international 
airspace, but only as a condition of entry approval. 
U.S. domestic rules implementing ADIZ requirements are contained in 
Chapter 5 of the Federal Aviation Administration’s Aeronautical Information 
Manual (AIM).33 The ADIZ regulations call for aircraft intending34 to enter 
U.S. national airspace to file flight plans and provide periodic reports.35 
Civil aircraft operating within a U.S. ADIZ must also “have a functioning 
two-way radio, and the pilot must maintain a continuous listening watch on 
the appropriate aeronautical facility’s frequency.”36 Foreign civil aircraft 
may not enter the United States through an ADIZ unless the pilot makes 
the required reports or “reports the position of the aircraft when it is not 
less tha[n] one hour and not more tha[n] 2 hours average direct cruising 
distance from the United States.”37 
If nations may legally establish an ADIZ under international law, then 
why is there so much fuss over the Chinese declaration? Clearly, China’s 
establishment of an ADIZ in international airspace is not in and of itself 
illegal. The manner in which Beijing made its announcement, and the way 
in which it intends to implement and enforce the new zone, however, are 
problematic.  
To begin, the new Chinese zone overlaps with the pre-existing Japa-
nese and the ROK ADIZs. Prior to Beijing’s unprecedented declaration, 
no other ADIZ has crossed over into that of another nation.38 The Chinese 
ADIZ also encompasses the airspace over Socotra Rock and the Senkakus, 
both of which are in dispute with South Korea and Japan, respectively. 
                                                                                                                      
32. KRASKA & PEDROZO, supra note 24, § 6.4.2.1. See also UNCLOS, supra note 31, 
art. 25(2). 
33. 14 C.F.R. §§ 99.1–99.49 (2004); Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation 
Administration, Aeronautical Information Manual (2010), chap. 5, sec. 6 (current as of 
Nov. 29, 2013) [hereinafter AIM]. 
34. AIM, supra note 33, sec. 5-6-1(b) (“All aircraft entering domestic U.S. airspace from 
points outside must provide for identification prior to entry.” Emphasis added). 
35. ADIZ flight plan requirements 14 C.F.R. §§ 99.11 (2004) and Position Reports 14 
C.F.R. § 99.15 (2004); AIM, supra note 33, sec. 5-6-1(c)(1) & 5-6-1(1)(c)(4). 
36. 14 C.F.R. §§ 99.9 and 99.13; AIM, supra note 33, sec. 5-6-1(c)(2) & 5-6-1(1)(c)(3). 
37. 14 C.F.R. §§ 99.15(c) (2004); AIM, supra note 33, sec. 5-6-1(c)(4)(c). 
38. Japan extended its ADIZ in 2010 to include its national airspace around Yonaguni 
Island, plus a two mile buffer zone. The result is a small overlap with Taiwan’s Flight In-
formation Region (FIR). Hsiu-chuan, supra note 26. 
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Normally, States do not establish ADIZs over contested territory.39 Given 
the heightened tensions between China, Japan and South Korea over these 
contested features, a responsible State actor, particularly one that aspires to 
be a regional (if not a world) power, should at the very least have consulted 
with its neighbors prior to making the declaration. By failing to consult 
with Tokyo and Seoul, China’s unilateral and escalatory action was per-
ceived by Japan and the ROK (and others) as further evidence of PRC ef-
forts to change the status quo in the East China Sea through coercion, 
thereby increasing tensions in the region and the risk of miscalculation.40 
Most egregiously, the new Chinese ADIZ procedures apply to all air-
craft transiting the zone, regardless of whether they intend to enter Chinese 
national airspace. Nations, including Japan and South Korea, may only ap-
ply their ADIZ procedures to aircraft that intend to enter national air-
space.41 The United States does not “support efforts by any State to apply 
its ADIZ procedures to foreign aircraft not intending to enter its national 
airspace” nor does the United States apply “its ADIZ procedures to for-
                                                                                                                      
39. Japan, for example, did not extend its ADIZ to include the airspace over the Kuril 
Islands, which are claimed by Japan, but have been controlled by Russia since the end of 
World War II. Reiji Yoshida, Tokyo has no Gripe with Seoul’s Expanded ADIZ, THE JAPAN 
TIMES (Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/12/09/national/tokyo-
has-no-gripe-with-seouls-expanded-adiz/#.Uv022_ldV8E. Japan has also not established 
an ADIZ in the airspace around Tokdo/Takeshima Island, which is claimed by both Ja-
pan and South Korea. Biden’s Pacific ‘Status Quo,’ THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Dec. 5, 
2013. 
40. John Kerry, Secretary of State, Statement on the East China Sea Air Defense 
Identification Zone (Nov. 23, 2013), http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/11/ 
218013.htm [hereinafter Kerry Statement] (“China’s . . . unilateral action constitutes an 
attempt to change the status quo in the East China Sea. Escalatory action will only in-
crease tensions in the region and create risks of an incident.”). See also Chuck Hagel, Secre-
tary of Defense, Statement on the East China Sea air Defense Identification Zone (Nov. 
23, 2013), http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=16392 [hereinafter 
Hagel Statement on East China Sea] (“The United States . . . view this development as a 
destabilizing attempt to alter the status quo in the region. The unilateral action increases 
the risk of misunderstanding and miscalculations.”). 
41. Jeremy Page, How the North American Air Defense Identification Zone Works, THE 
WALL STREET JOURNAL (Nov. 27, 2013), http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2013/11/ 
27/how-the-north-american-air-defense-identification-zone-works/; Tetsushi Kajimoto & 
Ju-Min Park, Japan, South Korean Military Planes Defy China’s New Defence Zone, REUTERS 
(Nov. 28, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/28/us-japan-china-idUSBRE 
9AR0AH20131128. 
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eign aircraft not intending to enter U.S. national airspace.”42 U.S. military 
aircraft not planning to enter foreign national airspace are specifically in-
structed not to identify themselves or otherwise comply with ADIZ proce-
dures established by other nations.43 To that end, Secretary of Defense 
Hagel stated on November 23, 2013, that the PRC announcement would 
“not in any way change how the United States conducts military operations 
in the region.”44 Three days later, two U.S. B-52 long-range bombers sta-
tioned in Guam flew through the PRC ADIZ without filing a flight plan or 
providing prior notification to Chinese authorities. The mission “was a 
demonstration of long-established international rights to freedom of navi-
gation and transit through international airspace.”45 The United States has 
additionally increased its surveillance operations in the newly declared 
ADIZ.46 
                                                                                                                      
42. Kerry Statement, supra note 40; Chuck Hagel & Martin Dempsey, Secretary of 
Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, U.S. Department of Defense Press 
Briefing by Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey in the Pentagon Briefing Room (Dec. 
4, 2013), http://www.defense .gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5335 (SEC. 
HAGEL: “[I]t’s not that the ADIZ itself is new or unique. The biggest concern that we 
have is how it was done so unilaterally and so immediately without any consultation or 
international consultation. That's not a wise course of action to take for any country.” 
GEN. DEMPSEY: “[I]t wasn't the declaration of the ADIZ that actually was destabiliz-
ing. It was their assertion that they would cause all aircraft entering the ADIZ to report 
regardless of whether they were intending to enter into the sovereign airspace of China. 
And that is destabilizing.”). See also KRASKA & PEDROZO, supra note 24, § 6.4.2.1 (“For 
example, in March and May 2008, U.S. F-15 fighter aircraft intercepted Russian Tu-95 
Bear heavy bombers in the Alaska ADIZ. After a fifteen-year lapse, Russia restarted its 
bomber surveillance flights in the Arctic in 2007. In the representative cases that occurred 
in 2008, when it was determined that the Russian bombers were on a training flight and 
did not intend to enter U.S. national airspace, they were allowed to continue on their mis-
sion without harassment or interference from the U.S. aircraft.”). Rowan Scarborough, 
Russian Flights Smack of Cold War, WASHINGTON TIMES (June 26, 2008), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/jun/26/russian-flights-smack-of-cold-
war/?page=all; NWP 1-14M, supra note 24, § 2.7.2.3. 
43. U.S. Department of Defense, DOD Instruction, 4540.01, Use of International 
Airspace by U.S. Military Aircraft and for Missile/Projectile Firings, ¶ 6.4 (2007), available 
at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/454001p.pdf (Department of Defense 
guidance states that U.S. “military aircraft transiting through a foreign ADIZ without in-
tending to penetrate foreign sovereign airspace are not required to follow . . . [ADIZ] pro-
cedures.”). 
44. Hagel Statement on East China Sea, supra note 40. 
45. Shanker, supra note 23. 
46. U.S. Navy Increasing Surveillance In China’s ADIZ, NHK (JAPAN BROADCASTING 
CORPORATION), Jan. 11, 2014. 
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Despite statements by the PRC that it has “followed common interna-
tional practices in the establishment of the zone” and that the zone “will 
not affect the freedom of flight in relevant airspace,”47 China’s application 
of its ADIZ regulations to transiting aircraft that do not intend to enter 
Chinese national airspace violates international law. All nations are guaran-
teed freedom of overflight in international airspace seaward of the territori-
al sea.48 China may not, consistent with time-honored freedoms of naviga-
tion and overflight, condition transits through international airspace on 
pre-notification to PRC authorities. 
Although the initial U.S. response to China’s declaration was firm and 
timely, subsequent actions by the United States demonstrate that Washing-
ton does not have a cohesive strategy to respond to China’s increasing ag-
gressiveness in the Near Seas. Despite stating that the United States does 
not support efforts by any nation to apply its ADIZ procedures to foreign 
aircraft not intending to enter its national airspace, on November 29, 2013, 
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued a notice to airmen 
(NOTAM) instructing U.S. civil aircraft to comply with China’s ADIZ re-
porting requirements.49  
The Administration attempted (albeit unconvincingly) to explain away 
the inconsistency in U.S. policy as a safety precaution, reaffirming that the 
FAA’s decision to issue the NOTAM should not be construed as U.S. ac-
ceptance of the PRC ADIZ.50 The White House Press Secretary even went 
so far as to say that “contrary to prior reporting, the FAA did not issue 
                                                                                                                      
47. Chinese Government Statement on Identification, supra note 1. 
48. UNCLOS, supra note 31, arts. 58(1) & 87(1)(b). 
49. U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, Notice to 
Airmen (NOTAM), A1916/13 [hereinafter NOTAM A1916/13], https://pilotweb. 
nas.faa.gov/PilotWeb/notamRetrievalByICAOAction.do?method=displayByICAOs&rep
ortType=RAW&formatType=DOMESTIC&retrieveLocId=UKFB&actionType=notam 
RetrievalByICAOs. 
50. Jen Psaki, Spokesperson, U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing, Dec. 2, 
2013, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2013/12/218178.htm#CHINA (“for safety 
and security of passengers, U.S. carriers operate . . . consistently . . . with the notices to 
airmen issued by foreign countries, as is the case in this case. Their concerns are about the 
safety and security of passengers. That is different from what the U.S. government policy 
is. It . . . in no way indicates U.S. Government acceptance of China’s requirements in the 
newly declared ADIZ and has absolutely no bearing on the firm and consistent U.S. Gov-
ernment position that we do not accept the legitimacy of China’s requirements.”). See also 
Jay Carney, Press Secretary, The White House, Press Briefing (Dec. 2, 2013), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/12/02/press-briefing-press-secretary-
jay-carney-1222013.   
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guidance to U.S. carriers with regard to the specific Chinese notice to air-
men.”51 This statement was either an intentional attempt by the Admin-
istration to mislead the American public or a complete failure in communi-
cation and coordination within the Interagency—the FAA NOTAM spe-
cifically refers to the “Regulations Regarding Flight Plan Submission in the 
East China Sea . . . ADIZ of People’s Republic of China” and instructs 
U.S. carriers to submit the required flight plans to the “Air Traffic Control 
Department of CAAC [Civil Aviation Administration of China].”52  
In any event, the decision to require U.S. civilian airlines to comply 
with the PRC ADIZ reporting procedures, for whatever reason, under-
mines Japanese and South Korean efforts to defy China’s illegal require-
ments and emboldens Beijing’s increasingly coercive and provocative ef-
forts to change the status quo in the East China Sea. Rather than taking an 
opportunity to strengthen international law of freedom of overflight in the 
oceans, the United States blinked. The U.S. decision is perceived (rightly or 
wrongly) by others as a tacit recognition of China’s claim. In this regard, as 
of December 2013, 55 civilian airlines from 19 countries, including Austral-
ia, Singapore and Thailand, have followed the U.S. lead and are complying 
with China’s illegal ADIZ requirements.53 Game, set, match to China.  
  
III. MILITARY ACTIVITIES BEYOND THE TERRITORIAL SEA54 
 
On December 5, 2013, the USS Cowpens (CG-63) was lawfully conducting 
surveillance of the PLAN aircraft carrier Liaoning in international waters in 
                                                                                                                      
51. Jay Carney, Press Secretary, The White House, Press Briefing (Dec. 3, 2013), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/12/04/press-briefing-press-secretary-
1232013.  
52. NOTAM A1916/13, supra note 49. 
53. R. S. Kalha, China’s ADIZ: A Case of an Overreach? (Institute of Defence Studies 
and Analyses, IDSA Comment, Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/Chin 
asADIZOverreach_rskalha_101213; Dylan Loh Ming Hui, China’s ADIZ over East China 
Sea: Implications for ASEAN, RSIS COMMENTARIES, No. 232/2013, Dec. 19, 2013; Mark 
Landler, Biden Urges Restraint by China in Airpspace Dispute, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Dec. 4, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/05/world/asia/biden-arrives-in-china-seeking-
restraint-from-beijing.html?_r=0.  
54. For a detailed discussion on the right to conduct military activities in the EEZ, see 
Raul Pedrozo, Preserving Navigational Rights and Freedoms: The Right to Conduct Military Activi-
ties in China’s Exclusive Economic Zone, 9 CHINESE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 9–29 
(2010); Raul Pedrozo, Responding to Ms. Zhang’s Talking Points on the EEZ, 10 CHINESE 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 207–23 (2011) [hereinafter Pedrozo, Responding to Ms. 
Zhang]. 
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the South China Sea. When Cowpens was within 45 kilometers (km)/28 
miles of the carrier, it was hailed by a PLAN warship and asked to leave the 
area. After Cowpens ignored the warning, a PLAN Amphibious Dock Ship 
intentionally crossed the bow of the U.S. warship at a distance of less than 
100 yards and came to a full stop, forcing Cowpens to take evasive action to 
avoid a collision.55 The matter was ultimately resolved without further inci-
dent after the Commanding Officer of the Cowpens spoke directly with the 
Commanding Officer of the Liaoning through bridge-to-bridge communica-
tions.56 After a brief conversation, the PLAN warship and the Cowpens 
departed the area.57 
Several days later, both sides confirmed that the event occurred, but in-
itially downplayed the significance of the incident. A short statement issued 
by the U.S. Pacific Fleet (PACFLT) on December 12 indicated that the 
Cowpens was “lawfully operating in international waters in the South China 
Sea” when it encountered the PLAN vessel and was forced to maneuver 
“to avoid a collision.”58 The statement also highlighted “the need to ensure 
the highest standards of professional seamanship, including communica-
tions between vessels, to mitigate the risk of an unintended incident or 
mishap.”59 The State Department additionally confirmed that a diplomatic 
protest had been filed at the highest level with the Chinese government.60 
Surprisingly, other DOD officials indicated that the occurrence was not 
immediately reported because “DOD didn’t view it as an incident that war-
ranted making an announcement” and praised the manner in which the 
encounter was resolved as “a testament to the mil-to-mil relationships that 
                                                                                                                      
55. Carl Thayer, USS Cowpens Incident Reveals Strategic Mistrust Between U.S. and China, 
THE DIPLOMAT (Dec. 17, 2013), http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/uss-cowpens-incident 
-reveals-strategic-mistrust-between-u-s-and-china/. 
56. Jon Harper, DOD Downplays South China Sea Incident Involving USS Cowpens and Chi-
nese Warship, STARS AND STRIPES (Dec. 16, 2013), http://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/ 
dod-downplays-south-china-sea-incident-involving-uss-cowpens-and-chinese-warship-
1.257958 [hereinafter Harper, DOD Downplays]. 
57. Captains’ Radio Chat Averted Near-Collision between Liaoning, USS Cowpens, SOUTH 
CHINA MORNING POST (Dec. 17, 2013), http://article.wn.com/view/2013/12/17/Capt 
ains_radio_chat_averted_nearcollision_between_Liaoning_U/. 
58. Jon Harper, Chinese Warship Nearly Collided with USS Cowpens, STARS AND STRIPES 
(Dec. 13, 2013), http://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/chinese-warship-nearly-collided-
with-uss-cowpens-1.257478. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
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we’ve begun to develop with the Chinese over the last several years.”61 
Even Admiral Samuel Locklear, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, was 
hesitant to label the Chinese behavior as “dangerous,” choosing instead to 
characterize the incident as “unnecessary and probably more unprofession-
al.”62 The Admiral added that lack of experience on the part of the PLAN 
captain and the obvious language barrier between the two crews were con-
tributing factors in the incident. 
Chinese officials echoed U.S. statements, indicating that the captains of 
the Liaoning and Cowpens spoke “professionally” on the radio during the 
encounter to peacefully resolve the issue and that both sides had discussed 
the matter “through normal channels and carried out effective communica-
tions.”63 The Defense Ministry (MND) statement also praised U.S.-China 
mil-to-mil relations, asserting that “relations between the Chinese and US 
militaries enjoy excellent prospects for development and both sides are 
willing to boost communication, coordinate closely, and work to maintain 
regional peace and stability.”64 Chinese media additionally reported that the 
PLAN would still participate in the annual U.S.-led Rim of the Pacific 
(RIMPAC) exercise off the Hawaiian Islands despite the December 5 con-
frontation.65 
Although the MND (like DOD) downplayed the incident, Chinese of-
ficials were quick to defend the actions of their warship, stating that the 
captain “appropriately handled the matter in strict accordance with opera-
tional procedures.”66 Similarly, a spokeswoman for the Foreign Ministry 
(MFA) made the incredulous statement that the PLAN’s actions were con-
                                                                                                                      
61. Harper, DOD Downplays, supra note 56 (Pentagon spokesman Colonel Steve War-
ren stated that “I don’t think it was a crisis-level incident by any stretch . . . I don’t believe 
tensions have heightened.”). 
62. Admiral Samuel J. Locklear III, U.S. Department of Defense Press Briefing by 
Admiral Locklear in the Pentagon Briefing Room (Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.defense.gov 
/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=5354.  
63. Zhuang Pinghui, Carrier Commander Spoke to US Ship Captain after Near Collision, 
SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Dec. 17, 2013), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/art 
icle/1384040/carrier-commander-spoke-us-ship-captain-after-near-collision; After Sea 
Incident, China Praises Ties with US, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 18, 2013), 
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/after-sea-incident-china-praises-ties-us [hereinafter After Sea 
Incident]. 
64. After Sea Incident, supra note 63. 
65. PLA Will Take Part in RIMPAC Despite Naval Confrontation with US, WANT CHINA 
TIMES (Dec. 18, 2013), http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20 
131218000147&cid=1101. 
66. After Sea Incident, supra note 63. 
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sistent with “international law and the freedoms of normal navigation and 
overflight.”67 
The MND justified the PLAN warship’s actions on several grounds. 
First, Cowpens should have been aware that it was entering a restricted navi-
gation zone because the China Maritime Safety Administration (MSA) had 
previously issued a notice to mariners (NOTMAR) announcing the exercise 
area between December 3 and January 3. Second, when Cowpens entered the 
exercise area, it ignored warnings from the PLAN warship to leave the re-
stricted zone. Third, after Cowpens crossed into the 45 km inner defense 
layer of the Chinese formation, it was determined that Cowpens posed a 
threat to the security of the carrier, prompting the PLAN warship to ma-
neuver to prevent further penetration of the defensive perimeter by the 
U.S. warship.68 Finally, Chinese media additionally charged that Cowpens 
was “tailing” and “harassing” the Chinese formation and that it took “of-
fensive actions” towards the Liaoning.69  
A careful analysis of China’s justifications for its aggressive, unsafe and 
unprofessional behavior during the Cowpens incident, however, clearly indi-
cates that the PLAN’s actions were inconsistent with international law and 
long-standing State practice. Moreover, they unlawfully restricted Cowpens’ 
freedom of navigation (and other internationally lawful uses of the sea re-
lated to that freedom) in international waters.70 
First, MSA did not issue the NOTMAR advising of the PLAN exercise 
from December 3, 2013, to January 3, 2014, until December 6, one day af-
ter the Cowpens incident occurred.71 Therefore, the U.S. warship was una-
ware that a restricted zone had been declared by the Chinese government. 
China’s half-truth about the promulgation date of the NOTMAR may ex-
plain why U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel changed his tune about the 
naval confrontation. Speaking at a press conference two weeks after the 
                                                                                                                      
67. Zhuang Pinghui, Carrier Commander Spoke to US Ship Captain after Near Collision, 
SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Dec. 17, 2013), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/art 
icle/1384040/carrier-commander-spoke-us-ship-captain-after-near-collision. 
68. Id. 
69. Qiu Yongzheng & Yang He, US ‘Plays Innocent’ after Near Collision at Sea, GLOBAL 
TIMES (Dec. 16, 2013), http://www.globaltimes.cn/NEWS/tabid/99/ID/832320/US-
plays-innocent-after-near-collision-at-sea.aspx. 
70. For purposes of this paper, the term “international waters” includes all maritime 
zones seaward of the territorial sea, including the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic 
zone, and the high seas. 
71. Bill Gertz, Chinese Warning a Day Late, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, Jan. 16, 2014, at 
p. A-10. 
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incident occurred, Secretary Hagel stated “that action by the Chinese . . . 
was not a responsible action. It was . . . unhelpful . . . [and] irresponsible.”72 
The Secretary added that the Cowpens incident is “the kind of thing that’s 
very incendiary, that could trigger or . . . set off some eventual miscalcula-
tion. And so this has been a very unhelpful event.”73 China’s deceptive 
statement about the NOTMAR also begs the question whether China actu-
ally intended to issue the notice prior to the exercise or whether the warn-
ing was issued after the fact as “damage control” to bolster its legal argu-
ment. 
Second, even if a NOTMAR had been issued in time, the establishment 
of a warning zone for the purpose of conducting a military exercise may 
not be used as an exclusion zone. Foreign ships and aircraft are not prohib-
ited from entering the area; rather, they are simply required to avoid unduly 
interfering with the declarant State’s lawful operations within the zone.74 
Moreover, the declarant State may not use force against a foreign ship or 
aircraft merely because it has entered the zone; force may only be used 
against foreign ships and aircraft in the zone to defend against a hostile act 
or demonstrated hostile intent. Thus, it was legally permissible for Cowpens 
to operate within the warning area, including surveillance of the Liaoning 
formation. The U.S. warship was subject only to the requirement of due 
regard for China’s lawful activities within the zone. 
Third, the MND alleges that Cowpens’ entry into the 45 km defensive 
perimeter of the Liaoning formation posed a security threat to the carrier 
and therefore justified a firm response. This argument is, not only legally 
inaccurate, but also disingenuous. In November 2013, a PLAN frigate was 
observed conducting surveillance of the USS George Washington Strike 
                                                                                                                      
72. Chuck Hagel & Martin Dempsey, Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint 
Chief of Staff, U.S. Department of Defense Press Briefing by Secretary Hagel and General 
Dempsey in the Pentagon Briefing Room (Dec. 19, 2013), http://www.defense.gov/trans 
cripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5345 [hereinafter Hagel & Dempsey Briefing].  
73. Id. 
74. Secretary of State, U.S. Department of State, SECSTATE WASHDC 010044Z 
NOV 96 MSG to AMEMBASSY VILNIUS, Subject: Naval Vessels in Baltic Economic 
Zones, ¶¶ 5 & 6 (Nov. 1, 1996) (“The United States Navy has frequently conducted naval 
activities, including live firing exercises, [on the high seas and] in the EEZ of other na-
tions. Normally, the method of notification is by Notice to Mariners (NOTMAR). The 
publication of a Notice to Mariners, however, does not relieve the state conducting poten-
tially hazardous activities, from liability. Typically, when our government conducts these 
exercises, we assume responsibility for range clearance and if a possibility exists of inter-
ference with another vessel or aircraft, we suspend our exercises until they can be safely 
completed.”). 
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Group at a distance of 30 km/19 miles from the U.S. carrier—the U.S. 
ships were conducting a naval exercise in the South China Sea.75 The com-
mander of the carrier strike group, Rear Admiral Mark Montgomery, indi-
cated that it was a “natural conclusion” that a PLAN warship would be op-
erating in the vicinity of the U.S. aircraft carrier and that communications 
with the PLAN frigate had been “professional.”76 There is no evidence that 
the U.S. warships demanded that the Chinese frigate depart the exercise 
area. Nor should China forget the incident that occurred in 2006 when a 
PLAN Song-class attack submarine shadowed the USS Kitty Hawk and 
surfaced within five miles of the carrier, well within the submarine’s firing 
range of its torpedoes and missiles.77 Under other circumstances, the U.S. 
warships could have taken defensive measures in response to such a pro-
vocative act, but they did not. 
More importantly, the PLAN warship’s action to block Cowpens from 
continuing on its intended course was not only unsafe and unprofessional, 
but also a clear violation of China’s legal obligations under the International 
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS).78 COLREGS are pub-
lished by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and prescribe the 
navigation rules that ships must follow at sea in order to prevent a collision 
or risk of collision between two or more vessels. At the very least, the acts 
of deliberately crossing within 100 yards of the bow of the Cowpens and 
coming to a full stop in front of the U.S. warship unmistakably violate a 
number of the “rules of the road” contained in the COLREGS, including 
Rule 8 (Action to Avoid Collision), Rule 13 (Overtaking), and Rule 15 
(Crossing Situation). As the flag State, China has an obligation to ensure 
that Chinese-flagged vessels operate in accordance with the COLREGS. 
China’s final justification appears to regard U.S. surveillance of the 
Liaoning formation as a per se threat to the security of the Chinese carrier, 
and therefore prohibited under UNCLOS and the UN Charter. Such a po-
sition is not only untenable under international law, but is also inconsistent 
with long-standing State practice that recognizes the right of all nations to 
                                                                                                                      
75. Greg Torode, China, U.S. Need ‘Cold War Rulebook’ to Avoid Air, Sea Mishap, REU-
TERS (Dec. 18, 2013), http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/12/18/china-usa-military-id 
INDEE9BH07L20131218. 
76. Id. 
77. China Sub Stalked U.S. Fleet, THE WASHINGTON TIMES (Nov. 13, 2006), http:// 
www.washingtontimes.com/news/2006/nov/13/20061113-121539-3317r/?page=all. 
78. Convention on International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, Oct. 20, 
1972, 28 UST 3459, TIAS 8587, 1050 U.N.T.S. 17 [hereinafter COLREGS]. 
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conduct surveillance and reconnaissance operations beyond the territorial 
sea of any nation. 
UNCLOS addresses intelligence collection in only one article—Article 
19(2)(c), which prohibits ships transiting the territorial sea in innocent pas-
sage to engage in “any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice 
of the defense or security of the coastal State.” A similar prohibition does 
not appear in Part V of the Convention regarding the EEZ or in Part VII 
regarding the high seas. Under generally accepted principles of internation-
al law, any act that is not specifically prohibited in a treaty is permitted. 
Consequently, intelligence collection in the EEZ is permitted under Article 
58 and Article 87 of UNLOS as a high seas freedom. 
China’s argument that intelligence collection activities are per se a 
“threat or use of force” in violation of UNCLOS and the UN Charter is 
equally misplaced. UNCLOS Article 301 simply calls on States to “refrain 
from any threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any State . . . .” Identical language is contained in Article 
2(4) of the UN Charter.79 UNCLOS, moreover, makes a clear distinction 
between “threat or use of force” on the one hand, and other military activi-
ties (including intelligence collection) on the other. Article 19(2)(a) govern-
ing innocent passage mirrors the language of UNCLOS Article 301 and 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, prohibiting ships in innocent passage from 
engaging in “any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity or political independence of the coastal State . . . .” The remaining 
subparagraphs of Article 19(2) go on to restrict other military activities in 
the territorial sea, including the limitations on intelligence collection in 
subparagraph 2(c) discussed above.80  
The separation of the two concepts—the use of force and intelligence 
collection—demonstrates that UNCLOS does not automatically equate 
one with the other. Intelligence collection, however else it may be charac-
terized, is not necessarily a threat or use of force” under UNCLOS or the 
UN Charter.  
                                                                                                                      
79. “All Members shall refrain in their international relations form the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” Charter of the United 
Nations art. 2(4), Oct. 24, 1945, 1 U.N.T.S. XVI. 
80. Note that a similar restriction applies to ships engaged in transit passage and ar-
chipelagic sea lanes passage. Articles 39 and 54 call on ships exercising the right of transit 
passage and archipelagic sea lanes passage to “refrain from any threat or use of force 
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of States bordering 
the strait [or the archipelagic State] . . . .” UNCLOS, supra note 31, arts. 39 & 54. 
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This issue was considered by the UN Security Council following the 
shoot down of a U.S. U-2 spy plane by Soviet Air Defense Forces near 
Sverdlovsk in 1960.81 An effort by the Kremlin to have the UN body adopt 
a resolution that would have labeled all U.S. U-2 flights over Soviet territo-
ry as acts of aggression under the Charter was soundly defeated in the Se-
curity Council by a vote of 7 to 2 (with 2 abstentions), thereby confirming 
that peacetime intelligence collection is consistent with the UN Charter.82  
Most commentators would therefore agree that, based on various pro-
visions of UNCLOS, it is logical, 
 
to interpret the peaceful uses/purposes clauses as prohibiting only those 
activities which are not consistent with the UN Charter. It may be con-
cluded accordingly that the peaceful purposes/uses clauses in Articles 88 
and 301 do not prohibit all military activities [including intelligence collec-
tion] on the high seas and in EEZs, but only those that threaten or use 
force in a manner inconsistent with the UN Charter.83 
 
Accordingly, Cowpens’ surveillance of the Liaoning on the 5th of December 
was a lawful, non-aggressive military activity that is consistent with interna-
tional law, including UNCLOS and the UN Charter. 
State practice similarly supports the conclusion that Cowpens’ surveil-
lance of the Chinese carrier was lawful. Historically, military ships and air-
craft have conducted intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) 
operations at sea as a matter of routine. During the Cold War, for example, 
Soviet surveillance ships (AGI) regularly collected intelligence on U.S. and 
NATO warships. Such surveillance activities were considered lawful and 
acceptable to the United States so long as they occurred seaward of the 
U.S. territorial sea, and provided that the AGIs complied with their 
COLREGS obligations and the U.S.–U.S.S.R. Agreement on the Prevention of 
Incidents on the High Seas (INCSEA).84  
                                                                                                                      
81. S.C. Res 4328, U.N. Doc. S/4328 (May 27, 1960). 
82. O.J. Lissitzyn, The Role of International Law and an Evolving Oceans Law, in ELEC-
TRONIC RECONNAISSANCE FROM THE HIGH SEAS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 566 (R. 
Lillich & J. Moore eds. 1980) (Vol. 61, U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies).  
83. Moritaka Hayashi, Military and Intelligence Gathering Activities in the EEZ: Definition of 
Key Terms, 29 MARINE POLICY 123–37 (2005). See also Pedrozo, Responding to Ms. Zhang, 
supra note 54, at 207–23. 
84. Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas, U.S.-
U.S.S.R., May 25, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 1168, T.I.A.S. No. 7379, 852 U.N.T.S. 151 [hereinafter 
INCSEA]; Protocol to the Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the 
High Seas, May 22, 1973, 24 U.S.T. 1063, T.I.A.S. No. 7624. Article III specifically recog-
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Although the Cold War is over, a number of nations, including Austral-
ia, Japan, Russia, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States, 
continue to conduct ISR operations in foreign EEZs and the high seas as a 
matter of routine.85 Even China has admitted to carrying out such opera-
tions in U.S. waters; at the annual Shangri La Dialogue in Singapore, Senior 
Colonel Zhou Bo informed the maritime security panel that the PLAN had 
conducted reconnaissance operations in the U.S. EEZ without America’s 
consent.86 A U.S. Defense Department report subsequently confirmed that 
PLAN vessels have been observed operating in the EEZ around Guam 
and Hawaii collecting intelligence against the United States, including dur-
ing the 2012 RIMPAC exercise.87 Although Washington considers the Chi-
nese surveillance activities in the U.S. EEZ to be lawful, “the activity un-
dercuts China’s decades-old position that similar foreign military activities 
in China’s EEZ are unlawful.”88  
Finally, Chinese media reports alleging that the Cowpens harassed and 
took offensive action against the Liaoning are a deliberate fabrication. China 
has presented no evidence that Cowpens was engaged in any measures, other 
than mere surveillance of the Chinese formation, that were harassing or 
                                                                                                                      
nizes the right to engage in surveillance of a foreign warship provided the surveillant ship 
or aircraft does so in a safe and professional manner:  
Ships engaged in surveillance of other ships shall stay at a distance which avoids the risk 
of collision and also shall avoid executing maneuvers embarrassing or endangering the 
ships under surveillance. Except when required to maintain course and speed under the 
Rules of the Road, a surveillant shall take positive early action so as, in the exercise of 
good seamanship, not to embarrass or endanger ships under surveillance.”  
Id., art. III(4). Similar language can be found in INCSEA agreements between Russia and 
the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, 
Greece, Japan and the Republic of Korea. OCEANS LAW AND POLICY, ANNOTATED SUP-
PLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, ¶¶ 
2.8, 2–36 (A.R. Thomas & James C. Duncan eds., 1999) (Vol. 73, U.S. Naval War College 
International Law Studies); David F. Winkler, Soviet Motivations to Negotiate (Naval Histori-
cal Center, Colloquium on Contemporary History Project, Seminar 10, Sept. 23, 2003), 
www.history.navy.mil/colloquia/cch10d.html. 
85. See Pedrozo, Responding to Ms. Zhang, supra note 54, at 209. 
86. Michael Richardson, Claiming China’s Maritime Bounty, THE STRAITS TIMES (June 
17, 2013), http://www.straitstimes.com/the-big-story/asia-report/opinion/story/claim 
ing-chinas-maritime-bounty-20130617. 
87. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, AN-
NUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: MILITARY AND SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS INVOLVING 
THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (2013), http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2013_china 
_report_final.pdf [hereinafter DOD China Report to Congress 2013].  
88. Id. 
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that rose to the level of a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent, thereby 
justifying a more aggressive response by the PLAN. These false allegations 
are a good example of how China uses “legal warfare” as part of a coordi-
nated strategy to shape international opinion and interpretation of UN-
CLOS away from the time-honored principles of freedom of navigation 
and overflight and toward increased coastal State sovereign authority in the 
EEZ and airspace above it.89  
 
IV. COASTAL STATE RESOURCE JURISDICTION 
 
On November 29, 2013, the 5th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the 
5th Hainan People’s Congress adopted the Hainan Province’s Measures to Im-
plement the Fisheries Law of the PRC.90 These new regulations, which took ef-
fect on January 1, 2014, require foreign fishing vessels to obtain prior ap-
proval from Chinese authorities to operate in the sea areas administered by 
Hainan Province—an area that includes over 2 million square kilometers of 
                                                                                                                      
89. The Chinese Communists Party (CCP) Central Committee and the Central Mili-
tary Committee (CMC) approved the concept of “Three Warfares,” (san zhong zhanfa) in 
2003 for use in conjunction with other military and non-military operations. This PLA 
information warfare concept is aimed at influencing the psychological dimensions of mili-
tary activity: 
 Psychological Warfare seeks to undermine an enemy’s ability to conduct combat op-
erations through psychological operations aimed at deterring, shocking, and demoralizing 
enemy military personnel and supporting civilian populations. 
 Media Warfare is aimed at influencing domestic and international public opinion to 
build public and international support for China’s military actions and to dissuade an ad-
versary from pursuing policies perceived to be adverse to China’s interests. 
 Legal Warfare uses international and domestic laws to gain international support and 
manage possible political repercussions of China’s military actions. 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ANNUAL 
REPORT TO CONGRESS: MILITARY POWER OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (2009), 
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/China_Military_Power_Report_2009.pdf. 
90. Xinhua Wang, PRC Approves Measures Requiring Approval of Foreign Fishing in Hainan-
Administered Waters, December 1, 2013, cited in CRAIG MURRAY & KIMBERLY HSU, U.S.-
CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION STAFF REPORT, CHINA’S NEW 
FISHING REGULATIONS SEEK TO JUSTIFY AND CONSOLIDATE CONTROL IN THE SOUTH 
CHINA SEA 1 n.1 (Jan. 27, 2014). For the fisheries law, see Fisheries Law Of the People's 
Republic of China (2004 Amendment) (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l Peo-
ple’s Cong. by Order No. 34 of the President of the People’s Republic of China, Jan. 20, 
1986; Amended for the second time by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 
28, 2004), available at http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=3663&lib=law [here-
inafter PRC Fisheries Law]. 
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ocean space in the South China Sea (i.e., the waters contained within Chi-
na’s infamous “nine-dash line”).91 Ships that fail to comply with the new 
regulations will be forced out of the area, will have their catch and equip-
ment confiscated, and can be fined up to ¥500,000 (about $82,000); in 
more serious cases, the vessel may also be confiscated.92  
As expected, both the Philippines and Vietnam condemned the new 
regulations, which encroach on traditional Philippine and Vietnamese fish-
ing grounds, not only within their respective 200 nm EEZs, but also on the 
high seas. The Vietnamese Foreign Ministry labelled the new fisheries rules 
“illegal and invalid.”93 Officials from the Vietnam Fisheries Society (VIN-
AFIS) likewise condemned China’s action as an “unreasonable and unac-
ceptable ruling.”94 VINAFIS President, Nguyen Viet Thang, charged that 
the new rules “clearly violate . . . UNCLOS [and Vietnam’s Law of the Sea 
and its sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands,] and do not con-
form to the [2002 ASEAN-PRC] Declaration of the Conduct . . . 
(DOC).”95 
Philippine Foreign Ministry (MFA) officials called the regulations a 
“gross violation of international law,” emphasizing that the new rules seri-
                                                                                                                      
91. PRC Fisheries Law, supra note 90, art. 35 (providing that “[f]oreign persons and 
foreign fishing vessels entering waters under this province’s administration to conduct 
fisheries production or fisheries resource surveys shall receive approval through the ap-
propriate State Council department. Foreign persons and foreign fishing vessels conduct-
ing fisheries production or fisheries resource surveys shall respect relevant national [level] 
fisheries, environmental protection, and exit/entry laws and regulations, and this prov-
ince's relevant rules.”). 
92. Id., art. 46 (providing that “[w]here a foreigner or a foreign fishing vessel violates 
the provisions in this Law by entering the jurisdictional water areas of the People's Repub-
lic of China to be engaged in fishery production or activities for investigation of fishery 
resources, he/it shall be ordered to leave or be banished, the fishing gains and fishing fa-
cilities may be confiscated, and a fine of 500,000 yuan or less may also be imposed; if the 
case is serious, the fishing vessel may be confiscated; if such acts constitute an offence, 
criminal liabilities shall be investigated in accordance with the law.”).   
93. Palace: Phl Won’t Accept China Sea Law, THE PHILIPPINE STAR (Jan. 12, 2014), 
http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2014/01/12/1277811/palace-phl-wont-accept-
china-sea-law. 
94. China Fishing Restrictions in East Sea under Fire, VIETNANET BRIDGE (Jan. 14, 2014), 
http://english.vietnamnet.vn/fms/government/93696/china-fishing-restrictions-in-east-
sea-under-fire.html [hereinafter China Fishing Restrictions]. 
95. Id. For the Declaration of Conduct, see Association of South Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, Nov. 4, 2002, 
http://www.asean.org/asean/external-relations/china/item/declaration-on-the-conduct-
of-parties-in-the-south-china-sea [hereinafter ASEAN DOC].  
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ously contravene “the freedom of navigation and the right to fish of all 
states in the high seas” and that “under customary international law, no 
state can subject the high seas to its sovereignty.”96 MFA officials likewise 
alleged that the new regulations were contrary to the ASEAN Declaration 
on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (ASEAN DOC) and 
warned that China’s action “escalates tensions, unnecessarily complicates 
the situation in the South China Sea, and threatens the peace and stability 
in the region.”97 Local fishermen were also assured that they would be pro-
tected by the government if they fish in high seas areas covered by the new 
regulations. In this regard, Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin stated that 
the government would escort Filipino fishing vessels if necessary.98 
The U.S. State Department also raised concerns, albeit tempered, stat-
ing that the restrictions were a “provocative and potentially dangerous act” 
and calling on China to clarify the legal basis under international law for its 
“extensive maritime claims” in the South China Sea [i.e., the “nine-dash 
line”].99 It is lamentable that the State Department did not take the oppor-
tunity to declare, once and for all, that China’s “nine-dash line” has no ba-
sis in international law. A similarly weak statement from the U.S. Ambassa-
dor to the Philippines, Philip Goldberg, expressed concerns that the new 
Chinese regulations were unilaterally imposed without consulting other 
countries and were done outside the context of the ASEAN DOC. The 
Ambassador additionally stressed that, although the United States does not 
have any territorial claims in the region, the United States does “have a 
deep interest in free navigation in the air and in the sea” and that all nations 
should be “concerned about miscalculations and unilateral actions in sea 
and air around the entire part of East Asia . . . that will lead to any escala-
tions.” Albeit well-intended, the U.S. statements demonstrate Washington’s 
aversion to firmly confronting Chinese indiscretions in the region and fall 
well short of addressing one of the critical issues in the South China Sea 
                                                                                                                      
96. Republic of the Philippines, Department of Foreign Affairs, Statement of the De-
partment of Foreign Affairs on the New Hainan Fisheries Law, Jan. 10, 2014, 
https://www.dfa.gov.ph/index.php/2013-06-27-21-50-36/dfa-releases/1900-statement-
of-the-department-of-foreign-affairs-on-the-new-hainan-fisheries-law.  
97. Id. 
98. China Fishing Restrictions, supra note 94; Philippines to Defy Beijing’s South China Sea 
Fishing Rule, Defence Chief Says, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE (Jan. 17, 2014), 
http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1407482/philippines-defy-beijings-south-
china-sea-fishing-rule-defence-chief-says. 
99. Jen Psaki, Spokesperson, U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing, Jan. 9, 
2014, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2014/01/219509.htm.  
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dispute—the validity of the “nine-dash line”—thereby feeding into China’s 
legal warfare strategy of using its domestic laws to solidify its territorial 
claims. 
China responded to the various protestations stating that the new regu-
lations were merely a technical revision of existing Chinese laws and that 
China had a right and obligation under international law, domestic law and 
State practice “to manage the living and non-living resources on relevant 
islands and reefs and in relevant waters.”100 Moreover, the new measures 
were aimed at protecting, proliferating, developing and making “rational 
use of fishery resources,” safeguarding “the legitimate rights and interests 
of producers of the fishery industry,” ensuring “the quality and safety of 
aquatic products,” promoting “the sustainable and sound development of 
the fishery industry” and protecting “fishery resources and the ecological 
environment.”101 A more pointed statement directed at the United States 
indicated that the U.S. accusations were “unreasonable,” and that the new 
regulations were similar to U.S. fisheries regulations and “in line with inter-
national practice and aimed at strengthening the protection of fishery re-
sources and the marine environment.”102  
Although China has the authority to adopt regulations to exploit, con-
serve and manage the living resources within its 200 nm EEZ103 and may 
“take such measures, including boarding, inspection, arrest and judicial 
proceedings, as may be necessary to ensure compliance with . . . [its] laws 
and regulations” applicable to the EEZ,104 it does not have authority to 
regulate foreign fishing vessels operating on the high seas. “The high seas 
are open to all States”105 and “no State may validly purport to subject any 
                                                                                                                      
100. Hua Chunying, Spokesperson, People’s Republic of China, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Regular Press Conference, Jan. 10, 2014, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/ 
s2510/t1117700.shtml.  
101. Hua Chunying, Spokesperson, People’s Republic of China, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Regular Press Conference, Jan. 9, 2014, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/ 
s2510/t1117017.shtml.  
102. US Accusations Groundless, CHINA DAILY (updated Jan. 13, 2014), http://usa.china 
daily.com.cn/epaper/2014-01/13/content_17232658.htm. 
103. UNCLOS, supra note 31, art. 56(1)(a) (“In the exclusive economic zone, the 
coastal State has sovereign rights for the purpose of . . . exploiting, conserving and manag-
ing the natural resources . . . of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and 
its subsoil”); id., art. 61(1) (“The coastal State shall determine the allowable catch of the 
living resources in is exclusive economic zone.”). 
104. Id., art. 73(1). 
105. Id., art. 87(1). 
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part of the high seas to its sovereignty.”106 Freedom of the high seas in-
cludes, inter alia, “freedom of fishing . . . .”107 Thus, “all States have the 
right for their nationals to engage in fishing on the high seas”108 and “shall 
cooperate with each other in the conservation and management of living 
resources in the areas of the high seas.”109 Similarly, with regard to strad-
dling fish stocks110 and highly migratory species,111 UNCLOS and the UN 
Fish Stocks Agreement call on States to cooperate on appropriate measures 
to conserve and manage such stocks.112 
To the extent that China’s new fisheries regulations apply in the high 
seas, they are clearly inconsistent with international law and completely in-
valid. Furthermore, to the degree they apply to disputed waters, the new 
regulations are at odds with China’s commitment under the ASEAN DOC 
to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate 
or escalate disputes in the South China Sea, unnecessarily raise tensions in 
the region, and further threaten peace and security in Southeast Asia.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
Freedom of the seas has been a central element of U.S. foreign policy since 
the founding of the Republic.113 Indeed, the Colonial Americans inherited 
this concept from the English, and before them, the Dutch, as an expres-
sion of the freedom of all States to trade and use the global commons 
                                                                                                                      
106. Id., art. 89. 
107. Id., art. 87(1)(e). 
108. Id., art. 116. 
109. Id., art. 118. 
110. Straddling stocks are stocks of fish that migrate between, or occur in both, the 
EEZ of one or more States and the high seas. United Nations Environment Programme, 
United Nations Atlas of the Oceans, http://www.oceansatlas.org/servlet/CDSServlet 
?status=ND0xOTk0MSZjdG5faW5mb192aWV3X3NpemU9Y3RuX2luZm9fdmlld19m 
dWxsJjY9ZW4mMzM9KiYzNz1rb3M~ (last visited Feb. 20, 2014). 
111. Highly migratory species are fish species with wide geographic distribution, both 
inside and outside the EEZ, and which undertake migrations on significant but variable 
distances across oceans for feeding or reproduction. Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations, Fisheries and Aquaculture Department, http://www.fao.org/fish 
ery/topic/13686/en (last visited Feb. 20, 2014).  
112. See UNCLOS, supra note 31, arts. 63 & 64; Agreement for the Implementation of 
the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 
1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks art. 5, Aug. 4, 1995, 2167 U.N.T.S. 3. 
113. KRASKA & PEDROZO, supra note 24, § § 7.1.3–7.1.4. 
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without encumbrance. Throughout our history, Americans have gone to 
war to preserve that freedom, recognizing that, without it, U.S. economic 
and national security interests are jeopardized.114 Thus, the risk of conflict 
arising from events in the South China Sea is becoming particularly acute. 
The region is home to some of the world’s busiest and most strategic sea 
lines of communication (SLOC). More than $5 trillion in commerce, in-
cluding over half of the world’s oil tanker traffic and more than half of the 
world’s merchant fleet by tonnage, flows through the region’s SLOCs on 
an annual basis; this includes over $1 trillion in U.S. trade.115 Freedom of 
                                                                                                                      
114. The United States fought two wars against the Barbary Pirates (1802–04 and 
1815) to preserve freedom of the seas for U.S. merchant ships in the Mediterranean. Free-
dom of the seas was also one of the impetuses for the Quasi-War with France (1798–
1800) and the War of 1812. A hundred years later, the United States would enter the First 
World War, in part, as a result of Germany’s unrestricted submarine warfare against U.S. 
merchant ships trading with the Allies. During his “peace without victory” speech in 1917, 
President Woodrow Wilson indicated that “the freedom of the seas is the sine qua non of 
peace, equality and cooperation.” Woodrow Wilson, Address of the President to the Senate of the 
United States, 11 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. SUPP. 318, 322 (1917). 
Years, later, freedom of navigation was one of the non-negotiable elements included in 
President Wilson’s Fourteen Points: “II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, 
outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in 
whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.” 
WOODROW WILSON & HOWARD SEAVOY LEACH, THE PUBLIC PAPERS OF WOODROW 
WILSON: WAR AND PEACE: PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGES, ADDRESSES, AND PUBLIC PAPERS 
(1917–1924) 159 (1927). America was once again drawn into a world war, in part, as a 
result of German unrestricted submarine warfare during World War II:  
Generation after generation, America has battled for the general policy of the freedom of 
the seas. . . . Unrestricted submarine warfare in 1941 constitutes a defiance . . . against that 
historic American policy. . . . Hitler has begun his campaign to control the seas by ruthless 
force and by wiping out every vestige of international law . . .  
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Fireside Chat to the Nation, Sept. 11, 1941. The im-
portance of high seas freedoms was subsequently stressed in point seven of the Atlantic 
Charter: “peace [after WWII] should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans 
without hindrance.” Atlantic Charter, Declaration of Principles issued by the President of 
the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Aug. 14, 1941, 55 Stat. 
1603, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/atlantic.asp. More recently, the U.S. Department of 
State emphasized that “freedom of [navigation] and overflight and other internationally 
lawful uses of the sea and airspace are essential to prosperity, stability, and security in the 
Pacific.” Kerry Statement, supra note 40.  
115. This traffic includes almost one third of global crude oil and over half of global 
LNG trade. U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, SOUTH CHINA SEA REPORT, 
(last updated Feb. 7, 2013), http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/South_China 
_Sea/south_china_sea.pdf.  
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navigation and overflight, however, like glory and superpower status, can 
be fleeting.  
Unless the United States takes immediate and affirmative action to 
firmly demonstrate its non-acquiescence with China’s aggressiveness in 
Asia-Pacific, and encourages U.S. friends and allies in the region to do the 
same, China will be one step closer to achieving its goal of bringing to frui-
tion its “salami-slicing” campaign and changing the international legal sys-
tem to accommodate its A2/AD strategy in the Near Seas. 
 
A. China’s ADIZ 
 
Rumors that China may be preparing to declare an ADIZ over the South 
China Sea prompted the United States to issue a surprisingly stern warning 
to Beijing on January 31, 2014:  
 
We have seen unconfirmed reports of Chinese preparations to declare a 
new ADIZ over portions of the South China Sea. We would consider 
such an ADIZ over portions of the South China Sea as a provocative and 
unilateral act that would raise tensions and call into serious question Chi-
na’s commitment to diplomatically managing territorial disputes in the 
South China Sea. We’ve made very clear that parties must refrain from 
announcing an ADIZ or any other administrative regulation restraining 
activity of others in disputed territories. And we would of course urge 
China not to do so.116 
 
That same day, Evan Medeiros, Senior Director for Asian Affairs at the 
National Security Council, stated that the United States is opposed to 
“China’s establishment of an ADIZ in other areas, including the South 
China Sea” and that the United States had “been very clear with the Chi-
nese that we would see that . . . as a provocative and destabilizing devel-
opment that would result in changes in our presence and military posture 
in the region.”117 
While encouraging, these U.S. admonitions leave unanswered how the 
United States will respond to China’s new ADIZ in the East China Sea. In 
fact, it could be argued that these statements implicitly reflect U.S. ac-
                                                                                                                      
116. Marie Harf, Deputy Spokesperson, U.S. Department of State, Daily Press Brief-
ing, Jan. 31, 2014, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2014/01/221118.htm#CHINA. 
117. Jun Kaminishikawara, U.S. Could Change Military Posture if China Expands Air De-
fense Zone, KYODO NEWS (Feb. 1, 2014), http://english.kyodonews.jp/news/2014/02/ 
269068.html.  
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ceptance of China’s ADIZ in the East China Sea as a fait accompli. If that is 
not the intention, then Washington must be equally insistent in challenging 
China’s new zone in the East China Sea.  
As a first step, the Administration should direct the FAA to immediate-
ly rescind the November 29 NOTAM and instruct U.S. air carriers not to 
comply with the ADIZ reporting procedures unless they intend to enter 
Chinese national airspace. China has an international legal obligation under 
Article 3bis of the Chicago Convention to “refrain from resorting to the 
use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight.” Therefore, stating that the 
U.S. NOTAM was issued as a safety precaution was a bit of a red her-
ring—does anyone in the Administration really believe that the Chinese are 
so politically unsavvy as to shoot down an unarmed civilian airline? The 
political and economic fallout for China would be staggering, certainly re-
sulting in economic sanctions from the Western powers, and a renewed call 
by the United States to regional nations to stand up to further Chinese ag-
gression. 
Secondly, the Administration should direct DOD to significantly in-
crease the number of surveillance, reconnaissance and observation (SRO) 
flights into the region. China is extremely sensitive to U.S. SRO flights in 
its EEZ; increasing the number of such flights will send a clear message to 
Beijing that the United States does not recognize the validity of the East 
China Sea ADIZ as currently enforced, and that there are costs associated 
with China’s failure to roll back the excessive zone. 
Lastly, China abhors the thought of addressing disputes in a multilateral 
forum. The Administration should therefore internationalize the ADIZ 
issue at ICAO. China is illegally interfering with freedom of overflight in 
international airspace, and the United States should work with other mem-
ber States of ICAO to demand that China issue written procedures clarify-
ing how the zone will be implemented and how intercepts will be conduct-
ed by the PLA Air Force (PLAAF). Annex 2 of the Chicago Convention 
provides that “interception of civil aircraft shall be governed by appropriate 
regulations and administrative directives issued by Contracting States in 
compliance with the . . .” Convention.118 Thus, the onus is on China to 
promulgate the intercept procedures that will apply in the ADIZ. U.S. do-
mestic rules implementing U.S. ADIZ requirements, including air intercept 
procedures, are clearly articulated in Chapter 5 of the AIM.119 Similar pro-
                                                                                                                      
118. Chicago Convention, supra note 29, Annex 2, Rules of the Road, sec. 3.8.1 (10th 
ed. July 2005). 
119. 14 C.F.R. §§ 99.1–99.49; AIM, supra note 33, chap. 5, sec. 6. 
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cedures have been adopted by Australia and Canada, and can be found in 
the Australian Visual Flight Rules Guide120 and the Canadian Aviation Regula-
tions.121 China should be encouraged at ICAO to follow suit. 
 
B. Military Activities beyond the Territorial Sea 
 
It is puzzling that some U.S. defense officials and academics continue to 
insist that the United States and China need to develop new rules of behav-
ior to manage U.S.-China encounters at sea and in the air.122 Former Chief 
of Naval Operations Admiral Gary Roughead was correct when he said 
that the COLREGS and other existing norms of the international structure 
were adequate for the United States and China to ensure safe and co-
operative interaction at sea: “In my mind, we don’t have to have a set of 
separate rules for a country [i.e., China] and how navies operate togeth-
er.”123  
The Chinese want to “negotiate” a new rule set so that they can slow-
roll the process to gain time to further solidify their military posture in the 
Near Seas. China’s tactics with ASEAN are illustrative. In 2002, China and 
ASEAN agreed to develop a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea 
that “would further promote peace and stability in the region.”124 Twelve 
years later, the negotiations to develop a binding Code are no further along 
than they were in 2002. The same can be said about U.S. efforts to encour-
                                                                                                                      
120. Visual Flight Rules Guide, Civil Aviation Safety Authority, ver. 4, May 2010 
(Austl.). 
121. Canadian Aviation Regulations, SOR/96-433, Minister of Justice, last amended 
July 4, 2012 (Can.). 
122. In response to the USS Cowpens incident, Secretary of Defense Hagel said the 
United States and China “need to work toward putting in place some kind of a mechanism 
in the Asia Pacific . . . to defuse some of these issues as they occur” to avoid a potential 
miscalculation. Similarly, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey 
added that the United States and China agreed in 2012 to develop “rules of behavior when 
we encounter each other in three particular domains—air, sea, and cyber, and those work-
ing groups have actually been meeting and making some progress.” Hagel & Dempsey 
Briefing, supra note 72. 
123. Interview Transcript: Admiral Gary Roughead, FINANCIAL TIMES (Jan. 18. 2011), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/993b0ca4-234d-11e0-8389-00144feab49a.html#axzz 
2uMZWS87a.  
124. ASEAN DOC, supra note 95, ¶ 10 (providing “[t]he Parties concerned reaffirm 
that the adoption of a code of conduct in the South China Sea would further promote 
peace and stability in the region and agree to work, on the basis of consensus, towards the 
eventual attainment of this objective.”).  
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age China to agree on procedures to ensure safe and professional encoun-
ters at sea. China will employ a similar approach to any negotiation with the 
United States to develop safety measures for unplanned air and sea en-
counters. As Professor Carl Thayer has correctly observed: 
 
The USS Cowpens incident reveals that after sixteen years of efforts to 
negotiate an agreement on maritime and air safety there is little evidence 
that military-to-military consultations and strategic dialogue have reduced 
strategic mistrust and raised transparency. A wide gulf continues to sepa-
rate China and the United States . . . .125 
 
The U.S.-China Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) was 
specifically established to facilitate consultations between DOD and the 
PRC MND for the “purpose of promoting common understandings re-
garding activities undertaken by their respective maritime and air forces.”126 
The only reason that the consultative mechanism has not lived up to its 
expectations is because the PRC delegation has repeatedly refused to dis-
cuss maritime and aviation safety measures, preferring instead to use 
MMCA as a platform to espouse their government’s opposition to U.S. 
arms sales to Taiwan, the mil-to-mil restrictions in section 1201 of the Na-
tional Defense Authorization Act of 2000,127 and the presence of U.S. SRO 
flights over China’s EEZ. 
                                                                                                                      
125. Thayer, supra note 55. 
126. Agreement on Establishing a Consultation Mechanism To Strengthen Military 
Maritime Safety, U.S.-China, Jan. 19, 1998, T.I.A.S. No. 12,924. 
127. Section 1201 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal 
Year 2000 prohibits mil-to-mil contacts with the PLA if that contact would “create a na-
tional security risk due to an inappropriate exposure” of the PLA to any of the following 
areas: 
(1) Force projection operations. 
(2) Nuclear operations. 
(3) Advanced combined-arms and joint combat operations. 
(4) Advanced logistical operations. 
(5) Chemical and biological defense and other capabilities related to weapons 
of mass destruction. 
(6) Surveillance and reconnaissance operations. 
(7) Joint warfighting experiments and other activities related to a transfor-
mation in warfare. 
(8) Military space operations. 
(9) Other advanced capabilities of the Armed Forces. 
(10) Arms sales or military-related technology transfers. 
(11) Release of classified or restricted information. 
(12) Access to a Department of Defense laboratory. 
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The Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) similarly aims to in-
crease naval cooperation among the region’s navies by providing a forum 
for discussion of maritime issues, and in the process generate a flow of in-
formation and opinion between naval professionals leading to common 
understanding and possibly agreement.128 In furtherance of this goal, 
WPNS developed the Code for Unalerted Encounters at Sea (CUES). The Code 
contains safety measures to limit mutual interference and uncertainty and 
facilitate communication when foreign military ships and aircraft make 
contact at sea, and could be used to guide U.S.-China encounters at sea and 
in the air. 
Some government officials and academics have argued that the United 
States should negotiate an INCSEA-like agreement with China to defuse 
tensions during encounters at sea.129 An INCSEA-like arrangement, pat-
terned after the U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreement, however would clearly be coun-
ter-productive to long-term U.S.-China relations.130 COLREGS, MMCA 
and CUES already provide a solid foundation to guide interactions between 
                                                                                                                      
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-65, 
113 Stat 512, sec. 1201 (1999). An exception applies to search-and-rescue and humanitari-
an operations or exercises. 
128. Both China and the United States are members of the Western Pacific Naval 
Symposium (WPNS). For information on WPNS 2013, see, http://www.navy.mi.th 
/wpns2013/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2014).  
129. See Eric A. McVadon, The Reckless and the Resolute: Confrontation in the South China 
Sea, 5 CHINA SECURITY 1 (2009); SHIRLEY A. KAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, RL 
32496, U.S.-CHINA MILITARY CONTACTS: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, 26 (2012); Sam Bate-
man, Solving the “Wicked Problems” of Maritime Security: Are Regional Forums Up to the Task?, 33 
CONTEMPORARY SOUTHEAST ASIA 1–28 (2011); Yang Fang, Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ) Regime in East Asian Waters: Military and Intelligence Gathering Activities, Marine Scientific 
Research (MSR) and Hydrographic Surveys in the EEZ (RSIS, Working Paper No. 198, May 21, 
2010), http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/WorkingPapers/WP198.pdf; Mark J. Valen-
cia, The South China Sea: Back To Future? EAST SEA (SOUTH CHINA SEA) STUDIES (Jul. 15, 
2011), http://www.nghiencuubiendong.vn/en/conferences-and-seminars-/second-intern 
ational-workshop/582-the-south-china-sea-back-tofuture-by-mark-j-valencia; Craig Allen, 
Team Obama Should Take the Reagan Approach to Rising Tensions in Western Pacific, 
FOXNEWS.COM (Dec. 27, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2013/12/27/team-
obama-should-take-reagan-approach-to-rising-tensions-in-western-pacific/; EAST-WEST 
CENTER, MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE GATHERING ACTIVITIES IN THE EXCLUSIVE 
ECONOMIC ZONE: CONSENSUS AND DISAGREEMENT, A SUMMARY OF THE BALI DIA-
LOGUE (June 27–28, 2002), http://www.eastwestcenter.org/sites/default/files/private/ 
BaliDialogue.pdf.  
130. See Raul Pedrozo, The U.S.-China Incidents at Sea Agreement: A Recipe for Disaster, 6 
JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY 207 (2012). 
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U.S. and PRC ships and aircraft operating in proximity of one another. 
There is simply no need to develop something special or unique for such 
encounters. Moreover, if China currently does not abide by its legal obliga-
tions under COLREGS, UNCLOS and the Chicago Convention, what 
makes the proponents of an INCSEA-like agreement believe that China 
would comply with its legal obligations under a new bilateral agreement 
with the United States? And do the proponents of an INCSEA-like agree-
ment really believe that China is going to consent in writing to recognize 
the right of the United States to engage in surveillance and reconnaissance 
activities against PLAN warships at sea?131 The prospect that such an 
agreement would preserve high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight 
is highly unlikely.  
As with the ADIZ declaration, the United States should international-
ize China’s unsafe and unprofessional seamanship at the IMO. China’s re-
peated and deliberate violations of the COLREGS are inconsistent with the 
international rules of the road, and the United States and other IMO mem-
ber States should insist that Chain refrain from acts that endanger ships of 
other nations operating in the Near Seas.  
Finally, China should be disinvited from further participation in the 
U.S.-hosted “Rim of the Pacific” (RIMPAC) naval exercises. RIMPAC is 
the world’s largest international naval exercise, with naval forces from 22 
nations taking part in this year’s exercise. Chinese participation in the exer-
cise could inadvertently run afoul of the NDAA restrictions on mil-to-mil 
contacts with the PLA. Additionally, it is time for U.S. officials to stop be-
ing deluded by the romantic notion that “engagement fosters understand-
ing of each other’s military institutions in ways that dispel misconceptions 
and encourage common ground for dialogue.”132 Improving the PLA’s 
warfighting capabilities by engaging in one-sided mil-to-mil contacts will 
not nurture mutual trust and help prevent misunderstanding. On the con-
trary, such contacts play into China’s “salami-slicing” strategy and are det-
rimental to long-term U.S. national security interests. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                      
131. Recall that Article III.4 of INCSEA specifically recognizes the right to engage in 
surveillance of a foreign warship provided the surveillant ship or aircraft does so in a safe 
and professional manner. INCSEA, supra note 84, art. III.4. 
132. DOD China Report to Congress 2013, supra note 87, at 62. 
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C. Coastal State Resource Rights 
 
China’s new fishing regulations apply to over 2 million square kilometers of 
ocean space contained within the notorious “nine-dash line.” The regula-
tions clearly encroach on the resource rights of the other South China Sea 
littoral States within their respective EEZs, as well as on high seas fisheries 
beyond the 200-mile limit, and are therefore inconsistent with international 
law, including UNCLOS. It is thus incredulous that the Department of 
State would call on China to “clarify” the legal basis of its excessive mari-
time claims under international law! The “nine-dash line” has no legal basis 
under international law—providing China an opportunity to “clarify” its 
position plays into China’s legal warfare strategy of using its domestic laws 
to modify the existing international legal system and solidify its maritime 
expansionism in the South China Sea.  
Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Russel came close to refuting the 
“nine-dash line” when he testified before the House Committee on For-
eign Affairs on February 5, 2014.133 However, the Assistant Secretary’s 
statement fell short in two respects. First, it does not represent the official 
position of the U.S. Government. If the United States is going to object to 
the “nine-dash line,” it must do so publicly in the form of a diplomatic 
note—preferably to the United Nations. Second, Mr. Russel left the door 
open for Beijing to employ legal warfare to explain away its position by en-
couraging China to “clarify or adjust its . . . claim . . . .”134 The “nine-dash 
line” is illegal, period—there is nothing to “clarify or adjust.” 
If a nation like Indonesia, which has a lot more to lose than the United 
States by going against the Mandarins in Beijing, can stand up to China and 
declare that “the so called nine-dotted-line map . . . clearly lacks interna-
                                                                                                                      
133. During his testimony, Assistant Secretary of State Russel indicated that,  
under international law, maritime claims in the South China Sea must be derived from 
land features. Any use of the ‘nine-dash line’ by China to claim maritime rights not based 
on claimed land features would be inconsistent with international law. The international 
community would welcome China to clarify or adjust its nine-dash line claim to bring it in 
accordance with the international law of the sea. 
Daniel R. Russel, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Testimony 
Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific 
(Washington, DC), Maritime Disputes in East Asia, Feb. 5, 2014, http://www.state.gov/p 
/eap/rls/rm/2014/02/221293.htm. 
134. Id. 
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tional legal basis and is tantamount to upset the UNCLOS,”135 certainly the 
United States—the preeminent naval power and guarantor of freedom of 
the seas around the world—should be able to muster the courage to do the 
same. This can be accomplished without taking sides on the underlying ter-
ritorial disputes over the South China Sea islands.  
The United States and Japan should encourage Vietnam to follow the 
Philippines’ lead and file a case for compulsory dispute settlement under 
Part XV of UNCLOS. China’s interference with Vietnam’s resource rights 
within its EEZ is clearly grounds for compulsory dispute settlement under 
Article 297 of UNCLOS. 
 
D. Concluding Thoughts 
 
Henry Kissinger once observed that “China never lived in a world of equal 
states. It was always the most powerful state in its region until it became a 
subject of foreigners in the nineteenth century. China never had to live in a 
system of equilibrium with its neighbors . . . .”136 China’s behavior since 
2010 demonstrates that it has not changed its mindset. The mistaken belief 
that China is now willing to coexist on an equal footing with the United 
States and our allies in Asia-Pacific is wishful thinking, at best. It is time 
that Washington “accept the reality that China has chosen to initiate a new 
Cold War against the United States and its Asian friends and allies” and 
that “failure to muster the resolve and policy clarity to cope with it only 
heightens the prospects of a hot war with unforeseeable regional and global 
consequences.”137 
At the end of the day, America did not defeat the Soviet Union during 
the Cold War by becoming their friends or acquiescing to Soviet demands. 
It won through a long-term, patient, bipartisan effort to stand up to Soviet 
aggression around the world. Beijing is betting that the United States now 
is so concerned over maintaining good relations with the PRC that Wash-
                                                                                                                      
135. United Nation Commission of Limits on the Continental Shelf, Note Verbale 
dated July 8, 2010 from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to the United 
Nations, No. 480/POL-703/VII/10.  
136. Henry Kissinger, Former U.S. Secretary of State, Expanded Version of Delivery 
at the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences (Vatican City): Current International Trends 
and World Peace (Apr. 28, 2007), http://www.henryakissinger.com/speeches/042807 
.html.  
137. Joseph Bosco, Dumb Like a Fox, POLITICO MAGAZINE (Dec. 5, 2013), 
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2013/12/dumb-like-a-fox-china-adiz-
100732.html#.Uv08ZfldV8E. 
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ington will do everything it can to restrain its friends and allies in Asia-
Pacific from antagonizing China. After all, such a strategy succeeded in 
2012 when Washington failed to stand up to Chinese coercion after China 
wrestled de facto control of Scarborough Shoal away from the Philippines. 
The United States cannot allow a similar fate to befall the Senkaku or the 
Spratly Islands.  
China, in defiance of the international law of the sea and the rules gov-
erning aviation since the origin of flight, and with disregard for the recog-
nized rights and freedoms of all other nations to use the world’s oceans, 
has attempted to expropriate large areas of the seas and international air-
space to advance its expansionist goals and A2/AD strategy. China seeks 
to abolish the freedom of the seas in order to acquire absolute control and 
domination of the Near Seas for themselves. Once these freedoms are lost, 
they will be gone forever. By controlling the Near Seas, China is one step 
closer to dominating the Asia-Pacific region, along with its strategic SLOCs 
and abundant resources, by force of arms. America can stand by and allow 
China to incrementally solidify its maritime claims in the region through 
threats and coercion, or we can, together with our allies, stand up to Chi-
nese brinkmanship before it is too late. 
 
